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UPDATE: AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ON THE
DEATH PENALTY-IT'S GETTING PERSONAL
Samuel P. Grosst
Americans' views on capital punishment have stabilized. In 1994,
when Professor Phoebe Ellsworth and I published a review of research
on death penalty attitudes in the United States,' we began by noting
that "support for the death penalty [is] at a near record high."'2 That
finding, like most of the others we reported, has not changed. None-
theless, it is interesting to pause and review the data on public opinion
on the death penalty that have accumulated over the past several
years. Stability is less dramatic than change but it may be equally im-
portant, and there is some news to report. Recent studies shed more
light on the reasons why Americans favor or oppose the death penalty,
reinforce earlier findings that their views may be less predictable in
concrete cases than they seem in the abstract, and hint at how these
attitudes might someday change.
I
GENERAL TRENDS
The General Social Survey ("GSS"), a yearly opinion poll con-
ducted by the National Opinion Research Center, is the best periodic,
general-purpose national poll available. 3 On twenty-one occasions
from 1972 through 1996 it has included the question: "Do you favor
or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? '4 From
t Thomas G. and Mabel A. Long Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I would
like to thank William Bowers, Theodore Eisenberg, Phoebe Ellsworth, Stephen Garvey,
Richard Nisbett, Norbert Schwartz, J. Frank Yates, and the participants at the March 1998
conference on How The Death Penalty Works, sponsored by the Cornell Law Review, for
helpful comments and suggestions, and Jennifer Matz for excellent research assistance.
This research was supported by funds from the Cook Endowment of the University of
Michigan Law School.
1 See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans'
Views on the Death Penalty, J. Soc. IssuEs, Summer 1994, at 19. For simplicity, I sometimes
refer to authors Ellsworth and Gross in the first-person plural, as "We."
2 Id. at 19.
3 Most of the polls cited in this Article can be found on a publicly available comput-
erized data base thanks to the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University
of Connecticut. They are available in LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File, as well as the
Westlaw and Dialog databases.
4 General Social Surveys, National Opinion Research Ctr., 1972-78, 1980, 1982-91,
199&-94, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File [hereinafter General Social
Surveys]. To be precise, in 1972 and 1973 the question was: "Are you in favor of the death
penalty for persons convicted of murder?"
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1982 through 1996, the proportion of respondents agreeing has
ranged from 70% to 76%, with no apparent temporal trend.5 That
represents a very high level of support for the death penalty and a
great increase over earlier decades. As we noted in 1994, this high
level of support for capital punishment might be explained as a reac-
tion to the sharp increase in homicide and other violent crimes that
began in the early 1960s and continued through the 1970s.6 Since
1982, those crime rates have gone down and up and down again,
while support for the death penalty has remained comparatively flat.
See Figure 1. 7
If homicide and crime rates affect death penalty attitudes, they
do so indirectly rather than through personal experience.8 Neither
prior victimization nor personal fear predict death penalty attitudes.
General concern about crime, however, and exposure to crime
through the media might be influential. In the last few years, Ameri-
cans have witnessed dramatic decreases in violent crime in several
large cities, 9 most notably New York.10 For the nation as a whole the
drop in violent crime has amounted to little more than a downturn
from levels that had reached extraordinary heights-as Figure 1
shows-although the decrease in the homicide rate has been more
substantial. This good news has not translated into reduced support
for the death penalty. As we pointed out in 1994, people who came to
support the death penalty because crime was increasing may not
change their views again when crime levels off or even decreases."
Moreover, the message may not be getting through. The news media
do report these cheering crime statistics; they may even exaggerate
their significance.' 2 But they devote a larger and growing portion of
their space and time to individual crime stories-murders, if possi-
5 See id. (1982-91, 1993-94, 1996).
6 See Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 1, at 40-42.
7 The sources used in Figure I reflect competing considerations. The GSS is the best
general-purpose, periodic national opinion poll available; the National Election Study
("NES") is comparable in quality, but has a different focus; Gallup has the longest history
of conducting national surveys that include questions on capital punishment; and Harris is
the polling organization with the next-longest record of conducting surveys on this issue.
Therefore, we have used GSS or NES data when possible and Gallup data otherwise-
except in 1997, for which we used Harris data because there were no relevant GSS, NES, or
Gallup polls. The time lines for violent crime and for homicide are based on data from the
United States Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports.
8 See Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 1, at 42.
9 SeeJames Risen, U.S. Violent Crime Drops Record 7%, L.A. TiMEs, June 2, 1997, at Al
("The FBI noted that the number of murders reported to police fell in each of the nation's
three largest cities.").
10 See David Kocieniewski, Crime in City Down in '97 by 9.1 Percent, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3,
1998, at BI (noting recent reductions in New York City's violent crime rate).
11 See Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 1, at 42.
12 For news reports of crime statistics, see, for example, Risen, supra note 9 (noting
that preliminary FBI statistics show "a record 11% drop in the number of murders"); Vib-
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SouRCE: The sources for the death-penalty attitude time line are: Gallup Pol Gallup Org.,
1953-1971, 1981; General Social Survey, National Opinion Res. Ctr., 1972-1978, 1980, 1982-
1994, 1996; American National Election Study, Center for Political Stud., 1995; Harris Pol
Louis Harris & Assoc., 1997. All poll data are available in LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File.
The sources for the homicide and violent crime time lines are: Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Sourcebook of CriminalJustice Statistics-1996, at 306 tbl.3.106
(1997) 1960-1995; FBI, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Uniform Crime Reports for the United
States 1957, 1958, 1959, 1996, 1997.
ble13-and the fictional world of television is filled increasingly with
scenes of crime and violence. 14 The effect is illustrated nicely in an
August 1996 Chicago Tribune national poll: 75% of the respondents
thought "crime in the nation" was increasing, but fewer than half
(48%) thought it was increasing in their own communities.' 5
lent Crime Survey Shows Steep Decline WASH. PosT, Apr. 14, 1997, atA7 (reporting that "[t]he
U.S. violent crime rate plunged more than 12 percent in 1995").
13 SeeJohn Carmody, The TV Column, WASH. Posr, Mar. 12, 1998, at C5 (reporting on
a survey by the Center for Media and Public Affairs that found that crime stories over-
whelmingly dominate local newscasts); Michael Winerip, Lookingfor an 11 O'Clock Fix N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Jan. 11, 1998, at 30, 33 (stating that "crime and violence continue to be the
mainstay of local TV news"). See Center for Media and Public Affairs, Crime Most Common
Story on Local Television News (visited May 21, 1998) <http://vnvw.cmpa.com/archive/
healthtv.htm>, for a complete version of this study.
14 See George Gerbner, Television Violence: The Power and the Peri in GENDER, RACE AND
CLASS IN MEDIA 547, 547-52 (Gail Dines & Jean M. Humez eds., 1995); cf. E-mail from
George Gerbner, Bell Atlantic Professor of Telecommunications, Temple University, to
Larry Gross, Professor of Communication, Annenberg School for Communication of the
University of Pennsylvania (Apr. 2, 1998) (on file with author) (showing high levels of
violence on television).
15 See Tribune Poll Market Shares Corp., Aug. 4, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Rpoll File (questions 15-16). Similarly, on another survey, 67% of respondents
thought crime nationally was increasing, and 45% thought it was increasing "a lot." Harris
Poll, Louis Harris & Assocs., May 5, 1997, available in LEXIS, News library, Rpoll File (here-
inafter Harris Poll] (question 1). The public is aware that the media overemphasize gory
crimes-90% said that the media were more likely to report "terrible violent crimes" than
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Race and sex, the two major demographic predictors of death
penalty attitudes,16 continue to be influential on every survey. On the
1996 GSS, for example, blacks were far less likely to favor the death
penalty than whites (51% to 75%), and women were considerably less
likely than men (65% to 79%).17 A recent survey throws an interest-
ing sidelight on the racial disparity: Black respondents were more
likely than whites both to say that their clergyman spoke out on the
issue of capital punishment (39% to 25%),18 and to report that their
religious beliefs had the biggest influence on their thinking on the
issue (33% to 17%).19
Political orientation has remained a stable predictor of death
penalty attitudes, comparable in magnitude to sex. On the 1996 GSS,
61% of Democrats, 70% of Independents, and 85% of Republicans
were in favor of the death penalty, as were 62% of liberals, 73% of
moderates, and 78% of conservatives. 20 Regional differences are less
clear. Past studies generally have found that Westerners favored the
death penalty the most, while Easterners and Midwesterners favored it
the least.2 1 Recent polls show more mixed results, and the only geo-
graphic pattern that seems to survive is a lower support in the East
than elsewhere. For example, the 1996 GSS reports the following
rates: East 66%, Midwest 72%, South 72%, and West 75%.22 However,
even that weak regional pattern is violated in some polls, 23 which sug-
gests that death penalty attitudes are becoming more homogeneous
across the country.
A 1994 poll by the Survey Research Center at the University of
California at Berkeley asked the following question:
Some people support the death penalty [for persons convicted of
murder because justice is served when these criminals are forced to
give "an eye for an eye"]. Others feel that the death penalty should
be abolished [because it is imposed in a way that discriminates
against minorities and poor people]. What about your opinion?
Would you say you are strongly in favor of the death penalty, some-
"[g]ood news [that] violent crime [is) decreasing," id. (Apr. 29, 1996) (question 1)-but it
appears to be affected nonetheless.
16 See Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 1, at 21.
17 See General Social Surveys, supra note 4 (May 25, 1996) (question 50).
18 See People & the Press: American Churches, Politics Pol Princeton Survey Research As-
socs., June 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File [hereinafter Princeton Poll]
(question 60).
19 See id. (question 14).
20 See General Social Surveys, supra note 4 (May 25, 1996) (question 50).
21 See Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 1, at 21.
22 See General Social Surveys, supra note 4 (May 25, 1996) (question 50).
23 See, e.g., Time, CNN, Yankelovich Partners Inc., Yankelovich Partners Inc., July 14,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File [hereinafter Yankelovich Poll] (question
11) (reporting the following results: East 81%; Midwest 78%; South 77%; West 75%).
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what in favor, somewhat opposed, or strongly opposed to the death
penalty?2
4
Each bracketed statement was read to half of the respondents, pro-
ducing four conditions: pro-death penalty argument only, anti-death
penalty argument only, both, and neither. This manipulation had no
discernable effect on the answers. For example, the combined
pro-death penalty positions (favor strongly and favor) were endorsed
by 80% of all respondents, 82% of those who heard neither argument,
78% of those who heard both arguments, 81% of those who heard the
pro-death argument only, and 79% of those who heard the
anti-death argument only. All of these differences are well within the
expected range of chance fluctuations. These responses illustrate
nicely a pattern that we noted in 1994: "[M]ost Americans know
whether they 'favor' or 'oppose' the death penalty, and say so in re-
sponse to any question that can reasonably be interpreted as address-
ing that issue."25 By contrast, for other public issues-foreigu policy
and criminal sentencing in general-the precise wording of the ques-
tions or the answers offered may make a large difference in the per-
centages of respondents who give particular answers, or who say that
they know enough to answer at all.26
For most Americans, a position on capital punishment is an as-
pect of self-identification. We say, "I'm for the death penalty," the
same way we say, "I'm a Republican," or "I'm a Red Sox fan." In this
long-standing debate, sides have been chosen, and the great majority
are for it. In fact, the consensus is so clear that the issue has become
less controversial, at least on the national scene. Since Michael
Dukakis's debacle in 1988, no serious candidate for president has ex-
pressed any opposition to capital punishment, and in 1996 President
Clinton and his Republican opponents joined forces and overwhelm-
ingly passed legislation that both greatly expanded the number of fed-
eral capital crimes and limited the ability of death-row prisoners to
seek review in federal court.2 7 As a barometer of public attitudes, the
title of the bill may be even more telling than its contents: "The An-
titerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996."
At the same time, use of the death penalty has spread. Seventeen
states performed a total of 158 executions in the fifteen years between
1977 (when executions resumed after a decade-long moratorium) and
24 Survey Research Ctr., University of California at Berkeley, 1994 Multi-Investigator
Study (visited Sept. 2, 1998) <http://csa.berkeley.edu:7502/D3/Multi/Doc/
multiOO.html>.
25 Ellmvorth & Gross, supra note 1, at 25.
26 See id. at 24-25.
27 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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the end of 1991.28 Twenty-nine states performed a total of 274 execu-
tions in the six years that followed (from 1992 through 1997),29 two
states enacted new death penalty laws (Kansas in 199430 and New York
in 199531) for a total of thirty-eight, and capital punishment has been
under active consideration in several of the twelve remaining aboli-
tionist states.32 We seem to have reached a new status quo in which
the death penalty is an accepted part of our criminal justice system; it
is widely available, widely supported, and less controversial than in de-
cades past. If so, it may increasingly be taken for granted and might
eventually become less salient. Perhaps in twenty or forty years many
Americans will once again have no clear position on capital punish-
ment, for or against. For now, it remains a powerful issue over which
there is little conflict because the sides are so severely mismatched.
II
EXPRESSED REASONS FOR DEATH PENALTY ATITUDES
A. Deterrence, Retribution, and Incapacitation
Most Americans who favor the death penalty do so primarily for
retributive reasons. 33 On a 1991 survey, most respondents who fa-
vored the death penalty continued to believe that it deterred crime,
but only 13% cited deterrence as a basis for their support; the most
popular justification by far was "[a] life for a life" (50%).3 4 There
have been no comparable studies since. Deterrence had been a more
prominentjustification for the death penalty-in 1981 35% of respon-
dents cited it as a basis for their support 35-but even then few Ameri-
cans believed that the death penalty was the best way to reduce crime.
In 1981 only 5% of respondents mentioned the death penalty when
28 See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUC. FuND, DEATH Row U.S.A. 8 (Summer 1998)
[hereinafter DEATH Row U.S.A.J.
29 See id.
30 See 1994 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 252 (H.B. 2578).
31 See Death Penalty-Imposition and Procedures-Assignment of Counsel, 1995 N.Y.
Laws ch. 1.
32 See, e.g., The Wisconsin Death Penalty Debate, 79 MARQ. L. REv. 647 (1996) (introduc-
ing several articles-that survey whether Wisconsin should adopt the death penalty); Adrian
Walker & Doris Sue Wong, No Death Penalty, by One Vote, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7,1997, atAl
(detailing the Massachusetts legislature's refusal "on a tie vote[ ] to reinstate the death
penalty, bucking a wave of support [for it]").
33 See Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 1, at 27-29 (describing how retribution has be-
come a more acceptable reason to support capital punishment and that more people now
use it to justify their support).
34 Gallup Poll Gallup Org., June 16, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File
[hereinafter Gallup Poll] (question 2).
35 See ABC News, Washington Post; ABC News & Wash. Post, May 20, 1981, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File [hereinafter ABC News and Post Poll] (question 61).
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asked, "What do you think is the best way of reducing crime?" 6 In
1990, on a similar question, 3% mentioned the death penalty;3 7 and in
1994, when asked what the government should do to reduce crime,
only 9% mentioned the death penalty first (following "Criminals serve
total sentence" (38%), "More police" (22%), and "Longer jail times"
(16%))38 and only 11% mentioned it second (trailing the other op-
tions mentioned above, plus "[putting c] onvicted criminals away for
life" (13%)). 39
From 1972 through 1990 belief in the deterrent effect of the
death penalty held steady at about 60%.4o A 1991 survey reported a
substantial decrease from that level to 51%,41 but because this could
have been a short-term or chance aberration, we attached no signifi-
cance to this finding in 1994.42 A more recent poll with similar data
suggests that the downward trend is real: in 1997 only 45% of those
surveyed agreed that the death penalty deters crime, and 52% said
that it does not.43 This shift should not be surprising. By 1997 the
pace of executions in the United States had picked up greatly, a fact
that has been widely reported even as publicity surrounding many spe-
cific executions has decreased. At the same time, most people still
believe that crime continues to increase,44 which is conspicuously in-
consistent with the theory that executions deter crime. In any event,
despite the fact that people frequently mention general deterrence as
the prime justification for capital punishment, changes in the level of
belief in deterrence have had no obvious relationship to changes in
support for the death penalty. Support went up in the 1970s and early
1980s while belief in deterrence remained steady, and support has re-
mained steady in the 1990s as belief in deterrence has dropped.
In 1991, on the most recent national survey that specifically asked
respondents to give reasons for their death penalty attitudes, incapaci-
tation-preventing a murderer from killing again-ranked as a dis-
tant second among reasons given for favoring the death penalty.4 5
Nineteen percent of those who favored capital punishment men-
tioned it, compared to 50% who said they favored capital punishment
36 CBS, New York Times, CBS News & N.Y. Times, June 27, 1981, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Rpoll File [hereinafter CBS & NY Times Poll] (question 58).
37 See Gallup Pol supra note 34 (Sept. 11, 1990) (question 20).
38 Grime and Shopping II, America's Research Group, Aug. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Rpoll File [hereinafter America's Research Poll] (question 55).
39 Id. (question 56).
40 See Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 1, at 27.
41 See Gallup Pol4 supra note 34 (June 16, 1991) (question 5).
42 See Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 1, at 27.
43 See Yankelovich Pol4 supra note 23 (June 5, 1997) (question 22).
44 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
45 See Gallup Poll supra note 34 (June 16, 1991) (question 2).
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because it represents "[a] life for a life."' 46 Earlier surveys are consis-
tent. A separate line of research, however, suggests that incapacita-
tion might be a more important issue than those findings seem to
indicate. In surveys conducted in several states, William Bowers and
various colleagues asked respondents whether they would prefer pun-
ishment by life in prison with absolutely no chance of ever being re-
leased on parole or returning to society, as an alternative to the death
penalty.47 In each state, support for the death penalty dropped
sharply when the survey offered life without parole ("LWOP") as an
alternative48 and declined further with the additional condition that
the murderer "be required to work in prison industries for money that
would go to the families of their victims." 49 Richard Dieter replicated
these results in a national poll using similar questions.50
The studies by Bowers and Dieter present problems of interpreta-
tion.51 The questions are worded forcefully and were asked repeat-
edly with escalating nondeath sentences-from "parole after 25 years"
to "absolutely no chance of parole" to "no chance of parole" plus resti-
tution.52 This format presents a danger that the shift in attitudes that
Bowers and Dieter observed was exaggerated. Between 1991 and
1998, however, seven other national polls have asked more neutrally
worded versions of the same question, usually: " [W ] hat should be the
penalty for murder-the death penalty or life imprisonment with ab-
solutely no possibility of parole?" 53 Table 1 summarizes the results
and shows a consistent 15-20% decrease in support for capital punish-
ment when life without parole is the explicit alternative-less than
that reported by Bowers and Dieter, but a sizeable effect all the
same.
54
46 Id.
47 See William Bowers, Capital Punishment and Contemporary Values: People's Misgivings
and the Court's Misperceptions, 27 Lw & Soc'Y RE . 157, 163 (1993); WilHiamJ. Bowers et al.,
A New Look at Public Opinion on Capital Punishment: What Citizens and Legislators Prefer, 22 AM.
J. CRim. L. 77, 102 (1994).
48 See Bowers et al., supra note 47, at 102, 103 tbl.V.
49 Id. at 104 tbl.V; accord Bowers, supra note 47, at 163-64; Bowers et al., supra note 47,
at 102-03.
50 See RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. C-m., SENTENCING FOR LIEn: AMERICANS
EMBRACE ALTERNATrvES TO THE DEATH PENALT" 3-5 (1993).
51 See generally Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 1, at 31 (explaining the potential
problems with Bowers's studies and related surveys).
52 Id.
53 E.g., Gallup Poll CNN, USA Today, Gallup Org., June 22, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Rpoll File [hereinafter Gallup, CNN, USA Today Poll] (question 1). Compare
icL ("In your view, what should be... ?"), with id. (Jan. 1998) (question 47) ("What do you
think should be the penalty for murder committed by a man... ?" (emphasis added)), and
id. (question 48) (same, "for murder committed by a woman... ?" (emphasis added)).
54 The average level of support for the death penalty on the seven surveys in Table 1
was 55%.
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TABLE 1
SUPPORT FOR DEATH PENALTY WHEN LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
IS THE ALTERNATiVE
"What do you think should be the penalty for murder-the death penalty or life
imprisonment with absolutely no possibility of parole?"
Death Penalty Life Without Parole
(%) (%)
June 1991 53 35
Apr. 1992a 50 37
Oct. 1993 59 29
June 1994" 50 32
Aug. 1994' 59 30
Aug. 1997 61 29
Jan. 1998
"For a man" 54 36
"For a woman" 50 38
SOURCE: All data come from Gallup Org., available in LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File, unless
otherwise noted.
'For this survey, the question began, "Which would you prefer as a penalty for murder..."
rather than "What do you think should be the penalty for murder...."
' For this survey, the question began, "In your view what . . ." rather than "What do you
think...."
'Data for this question come from CBS News, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File.
The Bowers and Dieter version of the life without parole ques-
tion-"would you prefer this [punishment] as an alternative to the
death penalty?"55-could be misinterpreted. Some respondents who
agreed might have meant that they wanted life without parole to be
available, along with the death penalty, as an alternative. If so, they
should be categorized as supporters of capital punishment because
the death penalty is always discretionary in the United States, whatever
the lesser penalty. Several of the more recent surveys report that from
8% to 11% of respondents volunteered that the choice between these
two options "depends."56 These answers might or might not indicate
a similar attitude-that the death penalty should be available for some
murder cases, and life without parole for others. Fortunately, a 1996
survey 57 used a less ambiguous format, and its results are comparable.
Those who said they favored the death penalty (79%) were asked: "If
you knew that murderers would be given a true life sentence without
55 Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 1, at 31 (quoting Bowers, supra note 47, at 163 (em-
phasis added)).
56 The percentages of volunteered "it depends" responses varied. See, e.g., CBS News,
Aug. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File [hereinafter CBS Poll] (question
1) (8%); Gallup, CNA, USA Today Pol4 supra note 53 (June 22, 1994) (question 1) (11%);
id. (Oct. 18, 1993) (question 17) (10%); Life Magazine-If Women Ran America, Gallup Org.,
Apr. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File (question 28) (10%).
57 See Crime in America Survey, Public Policy Research Inst., June 1, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File [hereinafter Public Policy Poll] (question 65).
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the possibility for parole, would you continue to favor the death pen-
alty?"58 Seventy-six percent of those who favored the death penalty-
60% of the entire sample-said 'Yes," and 20% said "No. '59
The attraction of life without parole may reflect retributive im-
pulses as well as a desire to prevent future killings.60 Most Americans
believe that murderers who are sentenced to life imprisonment will be
released in twenty, or ten, or even seven years.61 These perceived
sentences simply may seem too light as punishment for murder, re-
gardless of any future danger the defendant might pose. A recent
paper by William Bowers and Benjamin Steiner attempts to disentan-
gle these effects. 62
Since 1990 the Capital Jury Project has been collecting and ana-
lyzing data from interviews with jurors of capital trials in fourteen
states.63 Bowers and Steiner use data from the Capital Jury Project to
examine the effects ofjurors' perceptions of the alternative to a death
sentence on the outcomes of capital trials. Their initial findings track
survey data for the population at large. In each state 67% to 89% of
the capital jurors agreed that murderers get out of prison "far too
soon," and most agreed strongly.64 Also, in each state the capital ju-
rors' median estimates of sentences served by murderers who are not
sentenced to death were considerably lower than the mandatory mini-
mum term required before eligibility for parole.65 Bowers and Steiner
show that the jurors' beliefs about the alternatives to death sentences
have a major bearing on the sentences they return. For example, of
those who thought that a defendant who avoided the death penalty
would serve nine years or less, 69% voted for death; of those who
thought he would serve twenty years or more, only 43% voted for
death. 66 What explains this difference? Clearly, the desire for inca-
pacitation is a major factor; the jurors speak to that directly. Seventy-
seven percent thought the defendant "would be dangerous in the fu-
58 Id. (question 66).
59 Id. The remaining 4% replied that they did not know. See id.
60 See Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 1, at 31.
61 See DiETR, supra note 50, at 8; Sally Costanzo & Mark Costanzo, Life or Death Deci-
sions: An Analysis of CapitalJury Decision Making Under the Special Issues Sentencing Framework,
18 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 151, 163-64 (1994).
62 See William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by False Choice and Forced
Choice: Empirical Evidence of Misguided Discretion in Capital Sentencing (1998) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author).
63 See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early
Findings, 70 IND. LJ. 1043, 1043 (1995).
64 Bowers & Steiner, supra note 62, at 29 tbl.1.
65 See id.; see also Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instruc-
tions in Capital Cases, 79 CoRNEts L. REv. 1, 7 (1993) ("[Jlurors who believe the alternative
to death is a relatively short time in prison tend to sentence to death. Jurors who believe
the alternative treatment is longer tend to sentence to life.").
66 See Bowers & Steiner, supra note 62, at 37 tbl.3.
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ture"; 62% said that in choosing the punishment it was "very impor-
tant" to keep the defendant "from ever killing again"; and 39% were
"greatly" concerned that he "might get back into society someday, if
not given the death penalty. '67 But Bowers and Steiner also found
that the anticipated length of a noncapital sentence influences sen-
tencing decisions for jurors that do not think the defendant is danger-
ous, and that are not concerned that he might kill again.68 If we can
generalize from capital jurors to the population at large, these find-
ings suggest that "[c] onsiderations of retribution, as well as those of
incapacitation" explain the attraction of life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole as an alternative to capital punishment.69
B. Factors That Might Change Death Penalty Attitudes
In his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia,70 Justice Marshall
argued that if the American public knew the depressing truth about
the death penalty, they would not support it.7 1 This prediction-the
"Marshall Hypothesis"-has not fared well. Several old studies have
shown that few death penalty supporters are swayed by information
that it does not deter crime and is arbitrary and unfair.72 A couple of
more recent, small-scale studies add support to that conclusion, 73 as
do recent poll data. On one recent survey, 42% of respondents said
that a nonwhite defendant was more likely to receive the death sen-
tence than a white defendant. 74 On another, 49% agreed that a black
defendant was more likely to be sentenced to death than a white de-
fendant, and 67% agreed that a poor defendant was more likely to be
sentenced to death than one of average income. 75 Obviously, many
Americans do not consider discrimination by race or wealth a suffi-
67 Id. at 52 tbl.6 (percentages recalculated by author based on data in table).
68 See id.
69 Id. at 54.
70 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
71 See id. at 360-69 (Marshall, J., concurring).
72 See, e.g., Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A
Close Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists, 29 CRIME & DELiNQ. 116, 139-49
(1983).
73 See, e.g., Robert M. Bohm & Ronald E. Vogel, A Comparison of Factors Associated with
Uninformed and Informed Death Penalty Opinions, 22J. CRiM.JuJsT. 125, 140 (1994) (reporting
that exposure to death penalty information does not change "core" reasons for original
positions); Robert M. Bohm et al., Knowledge and Death Penalty Opinion: A Panel Study, 21 J.
CRIM. JusT. 29, 41-44 (1993) (finding that while knowledge does affect attitudes, they often
'rebound" to their original state as time passes).
74 See Los Angeles Times, L.A. Times, July 26, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Rpoll File [hereinafter L.A. Times Poll] (question 26).
75 See Newsweek Poll Princeton Survey Research Assocs., June 6, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File [hereinafter Newsweek Poll] (questions 9-10). In each case,
black respondents overwhelmingly agreed with these propositions-71% in the L.A. Times
Pol, see L.A. Times Pol supra note 74 (July 26, 1994) *(question 26), and 82% and 76%,
respectively, in the Newsweek Pol, see Newsweek Poll supra (June 6, 1997) (questions 9-10).
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cient reason to oppose capital punishment. There is a similar pattern
in public opinion on the issue of deterrence. An older set of surveys
asked death penalty proponents if they would still favor capital pun-
ishment if "new evidence show[s] ... that it does not lower the mur-
der rate," and 69% to 73% said they would.7 6
But how about those who say they would change their minds? A
quarter to a third of respondents who favor the death penalty say they
would not continue to support it if life without parole were available
instead,77 and about as many say they would oppose the death penalty
if they were to learn that it does not deter.78 On both issues, either
the facts are not getting through or the opinions are not as flexible as
the respondents report. The great majority of American states that
use the death penalty already provides for life without parole as the
alternative.79 Apparently, most people are not aware of this or do not
believe what they have heard. For example, in California, where life
without parole is the only sentencing alternative to the death pen-
alty,80 64% of respondents on a 1990 study said that they did not be-
lieve that criminals sentenced to life without parole will never be
released.8' Similarly, there is a vast amount of evidence that the death
penalty does not deter homicide-that is the clear consensus among
criminologists and police chiefs alike.8 2 Still, about 50% of the popu-
lation continues to believe that the death penalty does deter crime,
and-more telling-support for the death penalty has been unaf-
fected by a sizeable drop in belief in deterrence.8 3
In short, for the present, public opinion on the death penalty
seems locked in place. Inevitably, that will change. If change occurs
anytime soon, a couple of strands in the research suggest how it might
come about.
1. Incapacitation
So far we have talked about incapacitation in the context of the
argument by opponents of capital punishment that imprisonment for
life without parole is an option that makes the death penalty unneces-
sary. Indeed, judging by their expressed opinions, the majority who
favor the death penalty think of incapacitation as a comparatively mi-
76 Alec Gallup & Frank Newport, Death Penalty Support Remains Strong but Most Feel
Unfairly Applied, GALLuP POLL NEWs SERVICE, June 26, 1991, at 1, 3.
77 See Table 1; supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
78 See supra text accompanying note 76.
79 See Bowers & Steiner, supra note 62, at 120 n.122.
80 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988).
81 See No Parole Means What It Says, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 13, 1990, at A26 (reporting on a
survey by the Field Institute).
82 See, e.g., Michael L. Radelet & Ronald L. Akers, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The
Views of the Experts, 87J. CRm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 7-9, 12-15 (1996).
83 See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
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nor issue. In 1991 only 19% of pro-death penalty respondents men-
tioned incapacitation ("Keeps them from killing again") as a reason
for their support, while 50% mentioned retribution ("A life for a
life").84 This finding, however, may greatly understate the importance
of incapacitation in the debate between those who favor capital pun-
ishment and those who oppose it. On a 1997 survey respondents were
asked: "Whatever your feelings about the death penalty, which of the
following do you consider to be among the best reasons to support the
death penalty for persons convicted of murder?"85 Table 2 shows the
proportions of respondents who said that a given reason was "among
the best."
TABLE 2
ARGUMENTS FOR THE DEATH PENALTY
Percent who say the argument
is "Among the best reasons to
support the death penalty"
It removes all possibility that the convicted
person can kill again 74
It is a deterrent, that is, fear of such punishment
discourages potential murderers 53
It is not fair to make taxpayers pay to keep
convicted murderers in prison for life 49
"A life for a life": anyone who takes another
person's life deserves to be executed 48
SouRcE: All data come from Princeton Survey Res. Associates, June 6, 1997, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Rpoll File (questions 11-14).
In other words, whether respondents favor the death penalty or op-
pose it, most of them seem to think that incapacitation is the
pro-death penalty argument that is most likely to influence others.
In most states there is little general debate over the death penalty
as a social policy for the obvious reason that the issue has been unam-
biguously decided. Jury deliberations at the penalty phase of capital
trials are a different matter. There the jurors must decide case-by-case
whether to impose the death penalty or life imprisonment on particu-
lar defendants. These deliberations are often prolonged and painful,
and the outcome is rarely a foregone conclusion-despite the fact
that all capital jurors must endorse the death penalty at least to the
extent that they are willing to consider imposing it.86 In this context,
84 Gallup Pog supra note 34 (June 16, 1991) (question 2).
85 Newsweek Pol4 supra note 75 (June 6, 1997) (question 11).
86 The current standards for disqualification are defined by Wainwright v. Witt 469
U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (limiting the states' power to exclude death penalty opponents from
juries to those jurors whose "views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance
of his duties as ajuror in accordance with his instructions and his oath'" (quoting Adams v.
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as Bowers and Steiner document, the need for incapacitation surfaces
frequently as a key argument to win over those who may prefer a life
sentence, and to stiffen the resolve of pro-death jurors who might
waiver.87 In one common scenario, jurors who favor the death penalty
persuade others who do not that if the defendant is not sentenced to
death he will be released and might try to kill someone on the jury. A
juror in one case discussed this argument somewhat obliquely:
There were a couple of jurors that were recommending life in
prison.... We discussed the fact to our understanding that putting
someone into jail for life didn't mean that they were going to stay
there. That they were eligible for parole in twenty years, in some
cases seven years, and that this individual... would come out with
vengeance and try to go after those who had been involved in the
crime or [otherwise] involved.88
A juror in another case, who initially favored life imprisonment, was
more explicit:
Now one major thing, one thing that was discussed was the prob-
lem, this man, this man, if we give this man a life sentence he'd be
eligible for parole in ten years. And he could possibly be back out
on the streets. Would he do the same thing over again? Many
thought that he would. Course I didn't know. There were, I think,
about three women [who] were afraid of the man.... One of them
actually feared that the man might get out and come back after her.
I remember one of them saying that. The girl lives right not far
from the shooting. So that was discussed. And I remember, that's
the way I see it, about it, that's all I, I try to remember it and I just
felt, that's where I got to thinking about it, the death penalty.8 9
On the other side, jurors who oppose the death sentence have to
neutralize the incapacitation argument. To do so they often argue
that this defendant will never get out of prison because he has been or
will be convicted of other offenses, and his combined prison sentences
will keep him confined for life. For example, ajuror in a Virginia case
responded:
Something else that was brought up, that he would be tried for
shooting at [a second victim who did not die]. That he had another
trial to go through so they felt like the life sentence plus whatever
Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980))), and Morgan v. illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1992) (requir-
ing the exclusion from juries of some strong proponents of capital punishment). Also
relevant are Witherspoon v. illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968) (holding that ajury may not
impose the death sentence if "it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply be-
cause they voiced general objections to the death penalty"), and Lockhart v. McCre, 476
U.S. 162, 182-84 (1986) (permitting the exclusion of opponents of the death penalty de-
spite evidence that doing so affects the jury's decision on guilt or innocence).
87 See Bowers & Steiner, supra note 62, at 74-82.
88 Id. at 69 (alterations in original).
89 Id. (alterations in original).
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he got for shooting at [that victim] would be enough to keep him in
prison for life. That was the deciding factor. If he hadn't be [sic]
up on the other crimes, he would have been given the death
sentence.
9 0
As Bowers and Steiner document in detail, capital jurors greatly
underestimate the time that capital murderers who are not sentenced
to death will spend in prison, and they rarely believe that life without
the possibility of parole means what it says. 9 1 Apparently the possibil-
ity of additional terms of imprisonment is more likely to persuade ju-
rors that a defendant will remain confined for life than the option of
sentencing him to life without parole. The result is not merely ironic;
it is perverse: A murderer is spared the death penalty because he is
believed to have committed other noncapital, violent crimes as well.
2. Convicting the Innocent
On a 1991 Gallup survey only 11% of the respondents who op-
posed capital punishment mentioned "[p] ersons may be wrongly con-
victed" as a reason for their position.92 The leading justification by a
large margin was "[w]rong to take a life" (41%), followed by
"[p]unishment should be left to God" (17%). 9 3 However, just as inca-
pacitation is an argument for the death penalty that is important be-
cause it is persuasive to those who are inclined to oppose capital
punishment, so the risk of executing innocent defendants is impor-
tant because it is persuasive to those who generally favor the death
penalty.
On a 1993 survey respondents were asked, "Regardless of how you
feel about the death penalty, which of the following reasons do you
think is the best reason to oppose the death penalty . . . ?-94 The
leading reason offered was "Innocent[s] may be killed" (33%).95 Re-
spondents gave this reason ahead of "Immoral to kill" (21%), "Too
expensive" (12%), "Prison more severe" (11%), "Not a deterrent"
(10%), and "Racist punishment" (3%).96 On the same survey respon-
dents were read several assertions about the death penalty and asked
after each if it gave them "serious doubts," "some doubts," "minor
doubts," or "no real doubts" about the death penalty.97 The issue that
produced the most doubts was: "Over the years there have been many
90 Id. at 87 (alterations in original).
91 See id. at 26-34.
92 Gallup Poll, supra note 34 (June 16, 1991) (question 3).
93 Id.
94 Death Penalty Poll, The Tarrance Group & Greenberg, Lake, Mar. 1, 1993, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File (question 15).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. (questions 10-14).
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people sentenced to death who have later been found innocent."98
This was the only anti-death penalty argument that raised "serious
doubts" or "some doubts" for a majority of the respondents (58%)
and the only argument for which those with "serious doubts" (29%)
outnumbered those with "no real doubts" (24%). 99 Claims that the
death penalty is racist, that it is unduly expensive, that it does not
deter crime, and that long-term imprisonment plus restitution is a
more severe punishment than death were all substantially less
troubling.
The 1997 survey that asked respondents, regardless of their own
feelings, to rate arguments for the death penalty,100 also included a
parallel set of questions about arguments against the death penalty.
The clear winner, with 73% of respondents saying it was "among [the]
best reasons," was "innocent people may be wrongly convicted and
executed."10'
TABLE 3
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE DwEATH PENALTY
Percent who say the argument
is "Among the best reasons to
oppose the death penalty"
Innocent people may be wrongly convicted and
executed 73
It is always wrong to take a life 50
A life term is a worse punishment than quick
death by execution 43
Those convicted of murder should be kept alive
to help catch others who may have been
involved in the crime 32
SouicF: All data come from Princeton Survey Res. Associates, June 6, 1997, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Rpoll File (questions 15-17, 19).
The danger that innocent defendants might be sentenced to
death is not an abstraction. In the past decade incontrovertible exam-
ples have come to light repeatedly;10 2 some have been highly publi-
cized. 10 3 It is hardly surprising that on a 1995 Gallup survey, 82% of
98 Id. (question 12).
99 Id. (questions 10-14).
100 See Newsweek Poll, supra note 75 (June 6, 1997) (questions 9-19).
101 Id. (question 17).
102 See, e.g., MICHAEL L. RADEL-T ET AL., IN SprrE OF INNOCENCE: ERRoNEOUs CoNVc-
MIONS IN CAlrrAL CAsES (1992); Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of
Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21, 91 app. a (1987); Samuel R. Gross, The
Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in Capital Cases, 44 Burr. L. Rxv. 469
(1996).
103 See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Alabama Releases Man Held on Death Rowfor Six Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1993, at Al (describing the case of Walter McMillian, who spent six years on
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respondents who favored the death penalty said that they thought an
innocent person had been sentenced to death in the past twenty years,
and only 13% said that they thought it never happened. 04
How does the danger of executing innocent defendants affect
people's attitudes toward the death penalty? In the abstract, the im-
pact may be modest. On the 1995 Gallup survey that asked respon-
dents whether this ever happened, they also were told that "[s]ome
experts estimate that one out of a hundred people who have been
sentenced to death were actually innocent."'1 5 Seventy-four percent
of the 77% of respondents who supported the death penalty on this
survey--57% of all respondents-continued to support it in the face
of this information, and 20% did not.10 6 But "one out of a hundred"
may be a low estimate for the proportion of innocent defendants on
death row, and the question asks about innocent people who are "sen-
tenced to death" rather than "executed." A different version of this
question might show a greater reduction in support for the death pen-
alty, even in the abstract.
In actual cases, data from the Capital Jury Project indicate that
jurors are quite concerned about the danger of convicting innocent
defendants-sometimes. In several cases jurors have reported that
theirjury sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment because some
of its members felt the evidence of guilt, while strong enough to war-
rant a conviction, was not good enough for a death sentence.10 7 Also,
in a study of South Carolina's capital jurors, "lingering doubt" about
the defendant's guilt emerges as the single most powerful mitigating
factor in capital sentencing 08 However, unlike future dangerous-
ness, jurors' doubts about guilt are an issue in only a small proportion
of the capital murder trials that reach the sentencing hearings. 109
death row before being exonerated); Ted Gregory, Lacking 'Closure'After 12 Years, Nicaricos
Blast Judge's Verdict, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 5, 1995, atA14 (reporting on the case of Rolando Cruz,
who was twice sentenced to death before being exonerated).
104 See Gallup, CNN, USA Today Poll, supra note 53 (May 14, 1995) (question 30).
105 Id. (question 31).
106 See id.
107 See, e.g., Marla Sandys, Cross-Overs-Capital Jurors Who Change Their Minds About the
Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 70 IND. L.J. 1183, 1197 (1995) (reporting
that one juror "thought [the defendant] was guilty, but thought that [it] wasn't right to go
with death due to strength of evidence, circumstantial.., evidence" (first and second altera-
tions in original) (quoting from ajuror interview (internal quotation marks omitted))).
108 Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What DoJurors Think 2,
98 COLUM. L. REv. 1538, 1559, 1562-63 (1998).
109 See id. at 1571 tbl.8.
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III
WHO SHOuLD BE SENTENCED TO DEATH?
A. Which Crimes Should Be Punishable by Death?
A recent poll asked respondents whether they favored the death
penalty for each of a range of crimes." 0 The results (displayed in
Table 4) show a slight elevation in support for murder of the Presi-
dent over murder of an ordinary citizen (78% to 75%), but none for
murder of a police officer."' Among nonhomicidal crimes, the abso-
lute levels of support for the death penalty are probably less telling
than the rank ordering, and the relative levels of support for the listed
crimes seem to have been influenced by the amount of public atten-
tion they have recently received." 2 Two overlapping criteria can be
discerned: (1) the type of crime; and (2) the status of the victim. The
public seems to regard sex crimes as the worst, followed by drug
crimes, armed robbery (a crime of violence), and burglary (a property
crime). Further, a given crime is considered worse when the victim is
a child.113 The net effect should not be a surprise because the media
and the public have paid far more attention to rape and child molesta-
tion in recent years than in previous decades." 4
B. Who Should Be Eligible for the Death Penalty?
Recently, the issue of the death penalty for women reemerged
with the January 1998 execution of Karla Faye Tucker in Texas" 5 and
the March 1998 execution ofJudy Bueneano in Florida. 116 As of 1953,
several months after the execution of Ethel Rosenberg, only 75% of
those who favored capital punishment in general favored it for wo-
110 See Yankelovich Poll, supra note 23 (June 5, 1997) (questions 11-21). In addition,
other polls have found that Americans generally favor "[ejxpanding the number of crimes
to which the death penalty would apply," Harris Pol( supra note 15 (Aug. 18, 1993) (ques-
tion 4) (67% favor), or "[e]xtending the death penalty for some serious crimes other than
murder," Gallup, CNN, USA Today Poll, supra note 53 (Aug. 16, 1994) (question 42) (60%
favor).
III See Yankelovich Poll, supra note 23 (June 5, 1997) (questions 12-14).
112 See Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 1, at 38.
113 Similarly, on a 1991 survey, 24% supported capital punishment for "rape of an
adult" and 47% for "sexual abuse of a child." Star Tribune National Poll; Star Trib., Aug. 25,
1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File (questions 11-12); see also Garvey, supra
note 108 (manuscript at 21 & tbl.3) (showing that 46% of respondents claimed to be
"much more" likely to impose the death penalty when the "victim was a child").
114 Consider, for example, the 1995 passage of FED. R EviD. 413-415, which carve out a
special exception to the general prohibition against using propensity evidence to prove a
person's conduct. The new rules permit the use of any evidence of prior acts of sexual
assault or child molestation to prove a similar charge against a criminal or civil defendant.
115 See Sam Howe Verhovek, Karla Tucker Is Now Gone, but Several Debates Linger, N.Y.
TwEs, Feb. 5, 1998, at A12.
116 See Amy Driscoll, The Final Moments of a Murderer, M~mi HERALD, Mar. 31, 1998, at
1A
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TABLE 4
SUPPORT FOR THE DEATH PENALTY FOR PARTICULAR CRIMES
(%)
Murder of the President 78
Murder of an ordinary citizen 75
Murder of a police officer 75
Rapea 47
Sexually molesting a child 65
Selling drugs to children 44
Smuggling drugs 29
Selling drugs to adults 17
Armed robbery 17
Burglary of a home 8
SouRcE: All of the data come from Yankelovich Partners, Inc., June 5, 1997, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Rpoll File (questions 12-21).
'In August 1991, a survey found that 24% favored the death penalty for rape. See Star Tribune
National Poll, Star Trib., Aug. 25, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, RpoU File (question
11).
b In August 1991, a survey found that 47% favored the death penalty for sexual abuse of a child.
See id. (question 12).
men.1 17 By 1991, 95% of those who favored the death penalty "for a
man convicted of murder" also favored it "for a woman convicted of
murder" (63% of 66%),118 and inJanuary 1998, only 3% of those who
favored the death penalty thought the State of Texas should cancel
the scheduled execution of Karla Faye Tucker "because the criminal is
a woman."" 9 See Table 5. Support for the execution of teenagers
also continues to rise. In 1994 we thought that the level of support
reported on a 1989 poll (57%) "may be exaggerated" because it repre-
sented a sharp increase from previous rates.' 20 However, on a Gallup
Poll in late 1994, 61% of respondents said that teenagers should not
be spared the death penalty on account of their age.' 2 ' On the other
hand, consistent majorities continue to oppose the death penalty for
mentally retarded defendants, 122 which is sadly ironic: Of 467 defend-
117 See Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 1, at 39-40; Gallup Poll, supra note 34 (Nov. 5,
1953) (question 10).
118 Great America TVPoll Survey, Princeton Survey Research Assocs., May 5, 1991, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File [hereinafter Princeton TVPolI (questions 2-3).
119 Fox News, Opinion Dynamics Pog, Opinion Dynamics, Jan. 8, 1998, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Rpoll File [hereinafter Opinion Dynamics Poll] (question 3).
120 Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 1, at 39.
121 See Gallup, CN, USA Today Poll, supra note 53 (Sept. 7, 1994) (question 41). On a
1991 survey, 45% of respondents said a teenager should receive a death sentence if he
"commits a crime that could carry the death penalty for an adult" and 19% volunteered
that "it depends." Princeton TVPolI supra note 118 (Mar. 24, 1991) (question 15).
122 See Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 1, at 39.
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ants executed since 1977, three were women, 123 eleven were teenag-
ers, 124 and at least twenty-one were mentally retarded people.125
TABLE 5
ELiGIBIr FOR THE DEATH PENALTY
(Percent who support the death penalty for particular groups)
Yes No
Gender
Favor the death penalty for a man?' 66 18
Favor the death penalty for a woman?' 63 20
Cancel execution because the defendant is a woman?b  3 96
Death Spare
Age
Spare the death penalty because the defendant is a
teenager?' 61 30
Alright Not alright
Mental capacity
Is it alright to sentence a retarded person to death? 32 56
aThese data come from Princeton Survey Res. Associates, May 5, 1991, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Rpoll File.
bThese data come from Fox News Opinion Dynamics Po, Opinion Dynamics,Jan. 8, 1998, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File (question 3).
'These data come from Gallup, Sept. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File
(question 4).
' These data come from The Tarrance Group & Greenberg, Lake, Mar. 1, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File.
C. Mitigating Factors
In the past few years, two national polls by Princeton Survey Re-
search Associates have asked respondents whether they generally
would favor the death penalty under a variety of mitigating circum-
stances. Table 6 summarizes the results.
The most popular mitigating factors are those that shift some of
the culpability for the killing to another person-the actual killer
(when the defendant was only an accomplice) or the victim (if he or
123 See DEATH Row U.S-A., supra note 28, at 8.
124 Essential InformationJuveniles and the Death Penalty (visitedJune 22, 1998) <http:/
/wvw.essential.org/dpic/uvchar.html>.
125 The Death Penalty Information Center lists 33 mentally retarded offenders whom
jurisdictions have executed in this time period. See Essential Information, Mental Retarda-
tion and the Death Penalty (visited Apr. 7, 1998) <http://vw.essential.org/dpic/dpicmr.
html>. I have excluded those listed as having IQscores over 70, as "mildly" or "borderline"
retarded, and as "probable." This is a conservative measure. I suspect that with few excep-
tions, people who oppose the death penalty for mentally retarded defendants do not ap-
prove of executing a defendant like Picky Lee Grubbs of Missouri, who had an IQ of 72.
See id.
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TABL.E 6
MITIGATING FAC;TORS
Percent who favor the
death penalty even though
the defendant was:
July 1995 June 1997
Only an accomplice to the killing 29 25
Severely abused as a child 48 47
Provoked to violence by the victim 27 26
Under the influence of drugs or alcohol 63 55
In an emotional state involving a lover or family
member 49
Temporarily insane 46
A young teenager at the time of the crime 47
In jail so long he or she has become a different
person 46
Mentally retarded 9
Led to violence by political or ideological beliefs 56
SoutcE: Princeton Survey Res. Associates, July 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll
File (questions 8-16); Princeton Survey Res. Associates, June 6, 1997, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Rpoll File (questions 4-8).
she provoked the violence). In those cases only 25% to 29% of re-
spondents support the death penalty. At the other end of the contin-
uum, causal factors that might be seen as within the defendant's
control-intoxication or acting on political beliefs-do worst, with
55% to 63% supporting the death penalty. 126 Mitigating circum-
stances that are largely beyond the defendant's control but outside
the scope of the criminal act itself fall in between: if the defendant
suffered severe child abuse, 47% to 48% support the death penalty; if
he or she was in an "emotional state," 49%; if temporarily insane,
46%.
Youth and mental retardation also appear on the list of mitigat-
ing factors, and in this context, they both are more influential than
when presented separately. Only 47% of respondents favored the
death penalty for "young teenagers" (compared to 61% when the
question was asked in isolation) 27, and a mere 9% approved of the
death penalty for mentally retarded defendants (compared to
32%).128 This disparity, no doubt, is a contrast effect. Youth and re-
tardation were, respectively, the seventh and ninth mitigating factors
on the list used in the 1995 survey, and many respondents probably
calibrated their answers by reference to those they had given on previ-
126 AJanuary 1998 poll also found that 59% of respondents favored the death penalty
for a murder "if the convicted person was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the
time of the crime." Opinion Dynamics Poll, supra note 119 (Jan. 22, 1998) (question 2).
127 Gallup, CNN, USA Today Poll, supra note 53 (Sept. 7, 1994) (question 41).
128 See Table 5.
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ous items. As a group, they apparently felt that youth was about as
mitigating as most of the other factors listed, and mental retardation
was much more so.
These findings may have limited value as quantitative estimates of
public sentiment about particular mitigating circumstances, but they
are striking nonetheless. When confronted with only one of several
disparate factors-from becoming a different person in jail to having
suffered severe abuse as a child-support for the death penalty drops
considerably. For most of the factors, the drop is about 30% to 40%,
and for a few, the effect is larger still. Evidence from post-trial inter-
views indicates that penalty-phase jurors also are influenced by many
of the same considerations, 129 but these data do not speak to that. It
would be an extravagant jump to extrapolate from polls such as these
to the behavior of jurors who have sat through a trial and have con-
victed a defendant of capital murder. Rather, these data show that the
high level of public support for the death penalty in the abstract can
be reduced significantly simply by mentioning any of several factual
circumstances that are common in capital homicide cases.' 3 0
D. Particular Notorious Defendants
The OJ. Simpson murder prosecution in 1994 and 1995 com-
manded an extraordinary amount of public attention. In the four
years since, several other murder cases also have become mass specta-
cles even though, unlike the Simpson case, none included televised
court proceedings: the trial of Susan Smith in South Carolina in 1995
for drowning her two young sons; the trials of Timothy McVeigh and
Terry Nichols in 1997 and 1998 for the 1995 bombing of the federal
building in Oklahoma City; and the prosecution of Theodore Kaczyn-
ski, also in 1997 and 1998, for the "Unabomber" bombings. As one
minor aspect of this remarkable national preoccupation, several na-
tion wide surveys asked respondents whether they thought a particular
famous defendant should be sentenced to death. The results are dis-
played in Table 7, together with data on attitudes toward the death
penalty in general for those surveys that included such an item. Only
one of these surveys used the simplest form of the case-specific ques-
tion: "Do you think [name] should or should not receive the death
129 See Garvey, supra note 108, at 1559, 1562-63.
130 See, e.g., Daniel Goleman, When Rage Explodes, Brain Damage May Be the Cause, N.Y.
Tims, Aug. 7, 1990, at Cl (reporting that almost all 29 death row inmates involved in a
study, including some from violent, abusive families, had suffered brain injuries that are
likely to lead to violence); Dan Malone, T iewfrom Death Row, DALLAS MORMNG NEws, Apr.
20, 1997, at 1A (reporting that nearly 50% of the death row inmates who returned the
survey reported that they had been physically abused as children, and nearly 30% said they
had been sexually abused).
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penalty?"'13 1 In every other case, the question included a qualification
(typically, "if the defendant is convicted"), additional information
(typically, that the defendant has been convicted), or a specification
of the sentencing alternative to capital punishment (such as life im-
prisonment). These additions are summarized in the right-most col-
umn of Table 7.
A couple of patterns are apparent across these surveys. First, in
specific cases as in general, support for the death penalty decreases
when the alternative is life without parole (or a "real" life sen-
tence),132 Second, respondents were less likely to support the death
penalty for these particular defendants than to support it in general.
Throughout this period, public support for the death penalty ranged
from 70% to 75%.133 With one exception, support for the death pen-
alty for these highly publicized defendants was consistently lower, de-
spite the fact that they were all charged with extremely aggravated
multiple killings: two unsuspecting people slashed to death (Simp-
son), two helpless children drowned in a car (Smith), a mass murder
with a bomb (Nichols), and a series of killings and maimings with mail
bombs (Kaczynski). Part of the explanation may be that each case
included one or more of the mitigating factors that the American
public takes most seriously.' 3 4 Many people doubted O.J. Simpson's
guilt, 35 and those who did not probably agreed that he was emotion-
ally overwrought because of family problems. Once the story of Susan
Smith's sons' deaths unraveled, no one doubted her guilt, but she was
certainly "in an emotional state involving a lover," and as the evidence
at her trial eventually revealed, she had been sexually abused as a
child.13 6 Terry Nichols was widely viewed as only an accomplice to the
Oklahoma City federal building bombingl3 7-apparently a very pow-
erful mitigating factor, considering the magnitude of the crime.'3 8
And Theodore Kaczynski-in addition to the unique fact that he was
131 ABC News Poll; ABC News, June 2, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File
[hereinafter ABC News Poll] (question 2).
132 See Table 1; supra text accompanying notes 47-59.
133 See Figure 1.
134 See Table 6.
135 See Richard Morin, Poll Reflects Division over Simpson Case, WASH. POsr, Oct. 8, 1995,
at A31.
136 Stephanie Saul, Life, Not Death: Jury Rejects Execution for South Carolina Mom, NEws-
DAY, July 29, 1995, at A3.
137 See Gaylord Shaw, Spared Death/Jury Deadlocks on Nichols Penalty, NEWSDAY, Jan. 8,
1998, at A3.
138 Cf Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy,
Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CoRNELL L. Rav. 1557, 1580-1583 (1998) (discussing how
jurors seem less inclined to impose the death penalty in multiple-defendant cases).
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Support the Support the death
death penalty penalty for this
generally defendant (Additional information in
Defendant (%) (%) question)
oJ. SIWSON
Gallup (June 22, 1994)
Princeton (July 8, 1994)
ABC (July 20, 1994)
NBC/WSJ (July 26, 1994)
Harris (July 28, 1994)
SusAN SMrrI
Gallup (Jan. 18, 1995)
Gallup (July 9, 1995)
Princeton (July 28, 1995)
TimoTHY McVEIGH
[Gallup (Apr. 20, 1995)'
Princeton (July 28, 1995)
Yankelovich Ptrs.
(Apr. 17, 1997)
Princeton (May 30, 1997)
ABC (June 2, 1997)
Yankelovich Ptrs.
(June 5, 1997)
Princeton (June 6, 1997)
Harris (June 9, 1997)
CBS (June 11, 1997)
NBC/WSJ
(June 23, 1997)
Gallup (Aug. 13, 1997)
TERRy NicHOLs
Fox (Sept. 20, 1997)
Gallup (Nov. 23, 1997)
ABC (Jan. 7, 1 9 98)b
THEonoRE KAczYNsKI
Gallup (Nov. 23, 1997)
Fox (Jan. 1998)'
(If found guilty; death or
LWOP)
(Should DA seek death
penalty?)
(If convicted)
(If found guilty)
(If guilty)
(If found guilty)
(If found guilty)
(Was convicted)
(If convicted; death or
LWOP)]
(If convicted)
(If found guilty)
(If found guilty)
(Was convicted)
(Was convicted)
(Was convicted; death or
.real" life sentence)
(Was found guilty)
(Approve of jury's death
sentence?)
(Was found guilty;, death or
LWOP)
(If convicted)
(If convicted, death or
LWOP)
(Jury deadlocked on death
sentence)
51 (If convicted; death or
LWOP)
68 (If convicted)
SouncE: All data can be found in LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File.
Gallup conducted this survey after the crime, but before authorities had identified Mr.
McVeigh as the criminal.
bWhen ABC conducted this survey, the jury had deadlocked on the death sentence for Mr.
Nichols.
c Fox conducted the general death penalty poll on January 22, 1998; it conducted the poll
concerning Kaczynski on January 8, 1998. On the January 8 survey, data suggest that 56%
opposed a guilty plea with a life sentence and 49% supported the death sentence even if Mr.
Kaczynski were insane.
PUBLIC OPINION ON THE DEATH PENALTY
TABLE 7
SUPPORT FOR THE DEATH PENALTY FOR PARTICULAR
NoTORIous DEFENDANTs
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
turned in by a brother who campaigned to save his life-was obviously
insane.I3 9
The exception is Timothy McVeigh, the convicted Oklahoma City
bomber. On the seven surveys that asked for the respondents' views
on the appropriate punishment for McVeigh without specifying that
the alternative is life without parole and without mentioning the jury's
sentence, an average of 72% said he should be sentenced to death.
On three of these surveys the proportion who favored death for Mc-
Veigh averaged 3% higher than the proportion who favored the death
penalty in general (72% to 69%). The only two surveys that have com-
parable data for other defendants show the opposite results: On one
survey, 70% favored the death penalty in general, but only 55% did so
for Simpson; on the other survey, 74% favored it in general, but only
68% did so for Kaczynski. See Table 7. Asking respondents to choose
between death and life without parole did decrease support for the
death penalty for McVeigh, but even so on two polls after his arrest,
nearly two-thirds of respondents thought he should receive a death
sentence, about 10% more than favor the death penalty over life with-
out parole in general. 140 On a survey conducted the day of the
Oklahoma City bombing, before any suspect was identified, 80% of
respondents chose death over life without parole for the bomber.141
Apparently the McVeigh case defines the death-worthy end of the
spectrum of murder. We have heard of far worse from war criminals,
but it is hard to think of any peacetime crime that is more deserving of
the death penalty than a calculated massacre with a massive bomb.
CONCLUSION
Death penalty attitudes are about killing.' 42 Most Americans
favor the death penalty because they feel that killing is wrong; their
favorite explanation is "a life for a life." A minority oppose the death
penalty because they believe that killing by the state is wrong; their
usual explanation is that it is "wrong to kill." These are both absolutist
moral positions and unlikely to yield to information or argument. But
these two views are different in a critical respect. Opposition to the
death penalty is as simple in action as it is in theory: Do not execute
anybody. Support for the death penalty is never easy in practice.
There is no simple rule that specifies when to kill and when not. We
must choose which defendants to execute and which to spare-a fa-
139 See Kaczynski Pleads Guilty to Attacks; Unabomber to Receive Life Prison Sentence in Govern-
ment Deal, BALT. SUN, Jan. 23, 1998, at 1A
140 See Table 7.
141 See Gallup, CNN, USA Today Poll supra note 53 (Apr. 20, 1995) (question 3).
142 See Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 1, at 32-33.
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mously hopeless task that requires applying abstract support for the
death penalty to concrete cases.
In June 1997, 77% of respondents on a national poll said that
they approved of the jury's decision to find Timothy McVeigh guilty of
a capital crime. 143 But of those who said that, 57% answered "No" to
the question: "Are there other specific criminal cases . . .you can
think of in which you supported the death penalty or not?"'144 Consid-
ering other recent, highly publicized murder cases on which they ap-
parently had no particular views-O.J. Simpson, for example, and
Susan Smith-it is a good guess that many had no position on the
death penalty even in McVeigh's case, until they were asked. Almost
all Americans have stated self-conscious positions on the death penalty
in the abstract, but comparatively few have any occasion to apply those
views to concrete cases.
When Americans are asked about the death penalty in the con-
text of particular facts, support drops. It drops sharply in the face of
each of several mitigating factors that are so prevalent that at least one
is probably present in almost every death penalty case. With the tell-
ing exception of Timothy McVeigh, support is lower for particular fa-
mous defendants, even those charged with terrible multiple murders.
This is no surprise. In 1978 Phoebe Ellsworth found that only a mi-
nority of subjects who supported the death penalty in general were
willing to impose it in any of three hypothetical murder cases based
on the facts of actual death row prosecutions. 145 Similar effects occur
in other contexts. For example, most Americans distrust Congress as
an institution, but trust their own representatives, 146 and samples of
women and minorities report higher rates of discrimination against
their groups than against themselves as individuals. 147 Across a range
of issues, people's convictions run stronger when applied to a category
than to a particular case.
What causes this effect? The psychological explanations that are
offered focus on the images that are evoked when ajudgment is made
about a general category of people or events. 148 In this context, when
143 See ABC News Poll, supra note 131 (June 13, 1997) (question 2).
144 Id.
145 See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Attitudes Towards Capital Punishment: From Application
to Theory 4, 7 tbl.1 (Nov. 10, 1978) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
146 See GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP PoLL: PUBUC OPINION 1993, at 49-50, 132-33
(1994).
147 See Donald M. Taylor et al., Dimensions of Perceived Discrimination: The Personal/Group
Discrimination Discrepancy, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 233, 234 (Mark P. Zanna &
James M. Olson eds., 1994).
148 See, e.g., J. FRANKYATEs, JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 15-16 (1990) (noting how
people often make decisions based on "likelihood judgments"); Richard E. Nisbett et al.,
The Dilution Effect: Nondiagnostic Information Weakens the Implications of Diagnostic Information,
13 CoGNrrIVE PSYCHOL. 248, 272 (1981) (concluding that "[s]tereotypes may operate most
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a person is asked whether she supports the death penalty, the images
that come to mind are likely to be those that have dominated public
debate over capital punishment: rising crime rates and heinous
murders that go unpunished. The murderer-the individual to
whom this punishment must be applied-is hardly a part of this pic-
ture. He is seen, if at all, in abstract stereotypical terms such as
"crazed" or "cold hearted. 1 4 9 But when we learn almost anything
about the killer, even irrelevant details that are perfectly consistent
with homicidal mania-that he has a "famil[y], pets, hobbies,"150 that
he "lives in a trailer, likes to go hunting, has a friend named
Henry"' 51-the stereotypical image is diluted, and the focus shifts to
the individual. As Ellsworth explains, because "it is part of the mur-
derer prototype that he is not normal or ordinary in any respect....
any normal, ordinary detail tends to make people think that the par-
ticular murderer they are dealing with is an exception to the rule.' 52
This gulf between the abstract and the concrete comes into play
directly in capital trials. It explains why jurors who are screened for
their willingness to impose the death penalty15 3 nonetheless fre-
quently refuse to do so-even for multiple or mass murderers such as
Susan Smith or Terry Nichols-if the trial teaches them to view the
defendant as a person. But I do not expect this phenomenon to influ-
ence general public attitudes toward the death penalty any time in the
near future. The great majority of those who favor the death penalty
came to that view ten or twenty or thirty years ago, when executions
were nonexistent or rare-when the death penalty was an abstraction.
Having committed themselves to a point of view, they are unlikely to
reconsider the issue unless some fundamental change forces them to
do so. In the long run, however, the attention to Karla Faye Tucker
and other obviously "normal" defendants who are executed-or even
to fictional characters like Matthew Poncelet, the inmate executed in
the movie Dead Man Walking"54 -may be influential. The generation
that grows up with these images may have a different view of the
meaning of capital punishment.
powerfully in the abstract, applying primarily to undifferentiated groups or individuals");
see also Nancy Cantor & Walter Mischel, Prototypes in Person Perception, in 12 ADvANcES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 3, 4 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1979) (explaining that
people tend to categorize matters in an effort to reduce the complexity of the world).
149 See Ellsworth, supra note 145, at 5.
150 Charles G. Lord et al., Typicality Effects in Attitudes Toward Social Policies: A Concept-
Mapping Approach, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 658, 659 (1994).
151 Ellsworth, supra note 145, at 5-6.
152 Id. at 6; see also Lord et al., supra note 150, at 659-60 (noting that in applying gen-
eral attitudes to particular cases, death penalty proponents are affected more than oppo-
nents by the "typicality" of the defendant).
153 See supra note 86.
154 DEAD MAN WALKING (Polygram Video 1996).
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There is, however, one specific, concrete possibility associated
with the death penalty that could swamp all other considerations and
produce major shifts in public opinion in short order: the danger of
killing innocent people. This prospect comes up on both sides. On
the pro-death penalty side, it is the danger that the defendant, if not
sentenced to death, will be released and kill again. As we have seen,
pro-death penalty capital jurors often use that argument in delibera-
tions as an antidote to the reluctance to condemn an actual person to
death. On the anti-death penalty side, it is the danger that the defen-
dant himself may be innocent. Both of these dangers (especially sub-
sequent murders by convicted murderers) are uncommon-events, but
very concrete and potentially very influential. For the moment, both
issues are dormant.
We do keep hearing about innocent defendants who were sen-
tenced to death, but we hear about them when they are exonerated
and released from death row. Such an event is a failure of the system,
of course, but it is also a success: The worst has been averted, inno-
cence has been vindicated, all's well that ends well. In that context, it
may be relatively easy to accept death sentences for innocent defend-
ants as an inevitable flaw in a system that deserves support. But that
could change if a defendant's innocence is proven beyond doubt only
after he is executed. Executions of innocent defendants, or of de-
fendants who were widely believed to be innocent, played major parts
in successful movements to abolish the death penalty, from Michigan
in 1846155 to England in 1965.156 It could happen again. Just last
year, a death penalty bill failed to pass on a second reading in the
Massachusetts House of Representatives because one representative
switched his vote after a controversial murder verdict persuaded him
"that innocent people could face execution." 157 On the other hand,
we could see another Willie Horton-a convicted murderer who is
released and promptly rapes or kills again. Most likely it would not be
a capital defendant-common misconceptions to the contrary, they
are rarely released' 58-but the popular response would probably be
the same even if he had previously been convicted of second degree
murder or manslaughter: Support for the death penalty would harden
and might even increase. On either side of the debate, general views
may be trumped at any time by uncommon, unpredictable events that
are conspicuous, concrete, and personal.
155 See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 102, at 76.
156 See id. at 77.
157 Walker & Wong, supra note 32, at Al.
158 See Bowers & Steiner, supra note 62, at 29-34.
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